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#### Our interpretation is negatives should not be burdened with rejoinder against affs that defend something other than the desirability of topical action – winning the United States federal government should not substantially increase prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices by the private sector by at least expanding the scope of its core antitrust laws should always be a sufficient condition to vote negative.

#### Interpretation: Topical affirmatives must instrumentally defend n expansion of the scope of the United States core antitrust laws to substantially increase prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices.

#### Resolved means a policy

Louisiana House 5

(<http://house.louisiana.gov/house-glossary.htm>)

Resolution A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved". Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4)

#### Federal government is the legislative, executive and judicial

US Legal No Date (United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/)

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

#### Should requires action

AHD 2k

(American Heritage Dictionary 2000 (Dictionary.com))

should. The will to do something or have something take place: I shall go out if I feel like it.

#### ‘Its’ means cooperation must be governmental

US District Court 7 (United States District Court for the District of the Virgin Islands, Division of St. Thomas and St. John, “AGF Marine Aviation & Transp. v. Cassin,” *2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90808*, Lexis)

The Court inadvertently used the word "his" when the Court intended to use the word "its." The possessive pronoun was intended to refer to the party preceding its use--AGF. Indeed, that reference is consistent with the undisputed facts in this case, which indicate that Cassin completed an application for the insurance policy and submitted it to his agent, Theodore Tunick & Company ("Tunick"). Tunick, in turn, submitted the application to AGF's underwriting agent, TL Dallas. (See Pl.'s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 5.)

#### The “core” antitrust statutes are the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and FTC Act

Lisa Kimmel 20, Senior Counsel at Crowell & Moring, LLP in Washington, D.C., twenty years of experience as an antitrust lawyer and holds a Ph.D. in economics from the University of California at Berkeley; and Eric Fanchiang, associate in Crowell & Moring’s Irvine, CA office and a member of the firm’s antitrust and commercial litigation groups, 2020, “Antitrust and Intellectual Property Licensing,” in 2020 Licensing Update, Wolters Kluwer Legal & Regulatory U.S., https://www.crowell.com/files/20200401-Licensing-Update-Chapter-13.pdf

U.S. antitrust law is defined by federal and state statutes, as interpreted by the courts. The core federal statutes are the Sherman Act,1 passed by Congress in 1890, and the Federal Trade Commission2 and Clayton Acts,3 both passed in 1914. The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) (together the “agencies”) share enforcement of most areas of federal antitrust law but with some differences in the scope of their authority. The FTC has sole authority to enforce Section 5 of FTC Act, which prohibits (1) unfair methods of competition and (2) unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The FTC almost always pursues claims for anticompetitive conduct as unfair methods of competition and reserves charges of unfair or deceptive acts or practices for consumer protection violations. Though the FTC's authority to challenge unfair methods of competition goes beyond conduct prohibited by the Sherman and Clayton Acts, in practice the FTC brings most unfair methods of competition cases under the same standards that courts apply to Sherman Act claims. The most prominent exception is the invitation to collude offense, which falls outside the scope of the Sherman Act (if the invitation is not accepted, there is no agreement). The FTC challenges invitations to collude as so-called “standalone” violations of Section 5.4 The DOJ has sole authority to pursue criminal violations of the antitrust laws. Most states have their own state antitrust and unfair competition statutes. State law follows federal law to some extent, though as discussed below, may differ from federal law in meaningful ways that vary state to state. State attorneys general and private parties can also typically file suit to enforce both federal and state antitrust law.

#### Two standards

#### Predictable Limits—a bounded topic serves as a predictable stasis point for debate that guarantees thematic coherence there are a infinite amount of affs under their interp, making the neg prepare for them is impossible and favors the aff because they get leverage unpredictable offense—absent defined limits, debate’s competitive incentives create a race to the margins that distorts topic research and kills clash.

#### Putting our positions up for debate and studying their flaws best breaks down our neural bias towards intellectual arrogance, and fosters a culture of better scholarship---our brains are terrible at knowing when we’re wrong and updating our beliefs. The impact is intellectual humility---rewards bluster instead of thoroughness that trends us and society towards extreme, unvetted positions where we criticize without accepting criticism

Resnick 19 [Brian Resnick is a science reporter at Vox.com, covering social and behavioral sciences, space, medicine, the environment, and anything that makes you think "whoa that's cool." Before Vox, he was a staff correspondent at National Journal where he wrote two cover stories for the (now defunct) weekly print magazine, and reported on breaking news and politics. Intellectual humility: the importance of knowing you might be wrong. January 4, 2019. https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2019/1/4/17989224/intellectual-humility-explained-psychology-replication]

I’ve come to appreciate what a crucial tool it is for learning, especially in an increasingly interconnected and complicated world. As technology makes it easier to lie and spread false information incredibly quickly, we need intellectually humble, curious people.

I’ve also realized how difficult it is to foster intellectual humility. In my reporting on this, I’ve learned there are three main challenges on the path to humility:

1. In order for us to acquire more intellectual humility, we all, even the smartest among us, need to better appreciate our cognitive blind spots. Our minds are more imperfect and imprecise than we’d often like to admit. Our ignorance can be invisible.

2. Even when we overcome that immense challenge and figure out our errors, we need to remember we won’t necessarily be punished for saying, “I was wrong.” And we need to be braver about saying it. We need a culture that celebrates those words.

3. We’ll never achieve perfect intellectual humility. So we need to choose our convictions thoughtfully.

This is all to say: Intellectual humility isn’t easy. But damn, it’s a virtue worth striving for, and failing for, in this new year.

Intellectual humility, explained

Intellectual humility is simply “the recognition that the things you believe in might in fact be wrong,” as Mark Leary, a social and personality psychologist at Duke University, tells me.

But don’t confuse it with overall humility or bashfulness. It’s not about being a pushover; it’s not about lacking confidence, or self-esteem. The intellectually humble don’t cave every time their thoughts are challenged.

Instead, it’s a method of thinking. It’s about entertaining the possibility that you may be wrong and being open to learning from the experience of others. Intellectual humility is about being actively curious about your blind spots. One illustration is in the ideal of the scientific method, where a scientist actively works against her own hypothesis, attempting to rule out any other alternative explanations for a phenomenon before settling on a conclusion. It’s about asking: What am I missing here?

It doesn’t require a high IQ or a particular skill set. It does, however, require making a habit of thinking about your limits, which can be painful. “It’s a process of monitoring your own confidence,” Leary says.

This idea is older than social psychology. Philosophers from the earliest days have grappled with the limits of human knowledge. Michel de Montaigne, the 16th-century French philosopher credited with inventing the essay, wrote that “the plague of man is boasting of his knowledge.”

Social psychologists have learned that humility is associated with other valuable character traits: People who score higher on intellectual humility questionnaires are more open to hearing opposing views. They more readily seek out information that conflicts with their worldview. They pay more attention to evidence and have a stronger self-awareness when they answer a question incorrectly.

When you ask the intellectually arrogant if they’ve heard of bogus historical events like “Hamrick’s Rebellion,” they’ll say, “Sure.” The intellectually humble are less likely to do so. Studies have found that cognitive reflection — i.e., analytic thinking — is correlated with being better able to discern fake news stories from real ones. These studies haven’t looked at intellectual humility per se, but it’s plausible there’s an overlap.

Most important of all, the intellectually humble are more likely to admit it when they are wrong. When we admit we’re wrong, we can grow closer to the truth.

One reason I’ve been thinking about the virtue of humility recently is because our president, Donald Trump, is one of the least humble people on the planet.

It was Trump who said on the night of his nomination, “I alone can fix it,” with the “it” being our entire political system. It was Trump who once said, “I have one of the great memories of all time.” More recently, Trump told the Associated Press, “I have a natural instinct for science,” in dodging a question on climate change.

A frustration I feel about Trump and the era of history he represents is that his pride and his success — he is among the most powerful people on earth — seem to be related. He exemplifies how our society rewards confidence and bluster, not truthfulness.

Yet we’ve also seen some very high-profile examples lately of how overconfident leadership can be ruinous for companies. Look at what happened to Theranos, a company that promised to change the way blood samples are drawn. It was all hype, all bluster, and it collapsed. Or consider Enron’s overconfident executives, who were often hailed for their intellectual brilliance — they ran the company into the ground with risky, suspect financial decisions.

The problem with arrogance is that the truth always catches up. Trump may be president and confident in his denials of climate change, but the changes to our environment will still ruin so many things in the future.

Why it’s so hard to see our blind spots: “Our ignorance is invisible to us”

As I’ve been reading the psychological research on intellectual humility and the character traits it correlates with, I can’t help but fume: Why can’t more people be like this?

We need more intellectual humility for two reasons. One is that our culture promotes and rewards overconfidence and arrogance (think Trump and Theranos, or the advice your career counselor gave you when going into job interviews). At the same time, when we are wrong — out of ignorance or error — and realize it, our culture doesn’t make it easy to admit it. Humbling moments too easily can turn into moments of humiliation.

So how can we promote intellectual humility for both of these conditions?

In asking that question of researchers and scholars, I’ve learned to appreciate how hard a challenge it is to foster intellectual humility.

First off, I think it’s helpful to remember how flawed the human brain can be and how prone we all are to intellectual blind spots. When you learn about how the brain actually works, how it actually perceives the world, it’s hard not to be a bit horrified, and a bit humbled.

We often can’t see — or even sense — what we don’t know. It helps to realize that it’s normal and human to be wrong.

It’s rare that a viral meme also provides a surprisingly deep lesson on the imperfect nature of the human mind. But believe it or not, the great “Yanny or Laurel” debate of 2018 fits the bill.

For the very few of you who didn’t catch it — I hope you’re recovering nicely from that coma — here’s what happened.

An audio clip (you can hear it below) says the name “Laurel” in a robotic voice. Or does it? Some people hear the clip and immediately hear “Yanny.” And both sets of people — Team Yanny and Team Laurel — are indeed hearing the same thing.

Hearing, the perception of sound, ought to be a simple thing for our brains to do. That so many people can listen to the same clip and hear such different things should give us humbling pause. Hearing “Yanny” or “Laurel” in any given moment ultimately depends on a whole host of factors: the quality of the speakers you’re using, whether you have hearing loss, your expectations.

Here’s the deep lesson to draw from all of this: Much as we might tell ourselves our experience of the world is the truth, our reality will always be an interpretation. Light enters our eyes, sound waves enter our ears, chemicals waft into our noses, and it’s up to our brains to make a guess about what it all is.

Perceptual tricks like this (“the dress” is another one) reveal that our perceptions are not the absolute truth, that the physical phenomena of the universe are indifferent to whether our feeble sensory organs can perceive them correctly. We’re just guessing. Yet these phenomena leave us indignant: How could it be that our perception of the world isn’t the only one?

That sense of indignation is called naive realism: the feeling that our perception of the world is the truth. “I think we sometimes confuse effortlessness with accuracy,” Chris Chabris, a psychological researcher who co-authored a book on the challenges of human perception, tells me. When something is so immediate and effortless to us — hearing the sound of “Yanny” — it just feels true. (Similarly, psychologists find when a lie is repeated, it’s more likely to be misremembered as being true, and for a similar reason: When you’re hearing something for the second or third time, your brain becomes faster to respond to it. And that fluency is confused with truth.)

Our interpretations of reality are often arbitrary, but we’re still stubborn about them. Nonetheless, the same observations can lead to wildly different conclusions.

(Here’s that same sentence in GIF form.)

For every sense and every component of human judgment, there are illusions and ambiguities we interpret arbitrarily.

Some are gravely serious. White people often perceive black men to be bigger, taller, and more muscular (and therefore more threatening) than they really are. That’s racial bias — but it’s also a socially constructed illusion. When we’re taught or learn to fear other people, our brains distort their potential threat. They seem more menacing, and we want to build walls around them. When we learn or are taught that other people are less than human, we’re less likely to look upon them kindly and more likely to be okay when violence is committed against them.

Not only are our interpretations of the world often arbitrary, but we’re often overconfident in them. “Our ignorance is invisible to us,” David Dunning, an expert on human blind spots, says.

You might recognize his name as half of the psychological phenomenon that bears his name: the Dunning-Kruger effect. That’s where people of low ability — let’s say, those who fail to understand logic puzzles — tend to unduly overestimate their abilities. Inexperience masquerades as expertise.

An irony of the Dunning-Kruger effect is that so many people misinterpret it, are overconfident in their understanding of it, and get it wrong.

When people talk or write about the Dunning-Kruger effect, it’s almost always in reference to other people. “The fact is this is a phenomenon that visits all of us sooner or later,” Dunning says. We’re all overconfident in our ignorance from time to time. (Perhaps related: Some 65 percent of Americans believe they’re more intelligent than average, which is wishful thinking.)

Similarly, we’re overconfident in our ability to remember. Human memory is extremely malleable, prone to small changes. When we remember, we don’t wind back our minds to a certain time and relive that exact moment, yet many of us think our memories work like a videotape.

Dunning hopes his work helps people understand that “not knowing the scope of your own ignorance is part of the human condition,” he says. “But the problem with it is we see it in other people, and we don’t see it in ourselves. The first rule of the Dunning-Kruger club is you don’t know you’re a member of the Dunning-Kruger club.”

People are unlikely to judge you harshly for admitting you’re wrong

In 2012, psychologist Will Gervais scored an honor any PhD science student would covet: a co-authored paper in the journal Science, one of the top interdisciplinary scientific journals in the world. Publishing in Science doesn’t just help a researcher rise up in academic circles; it often gets them a lot of media attention too.

One of the experiments in the paper tried to see if getting people to think more rationally would make them less willing to report religious beliefs. They had people look at a picture of Rodin’s The Thinker or another statue. They thought The Thinker would nudge people to think harder, more analytically. In this more rational frame of mind, then, the participants would be less likely to endorse believing in something as faith-based and invisible as religion, and that’s what the study found. It was catnip for science journalists: one small trick to change the way we think.

But it was a tiny, small-sample study, the exact type that is prone to yielding false positives. Several years later, another lab attempted to replicate the findings with a much larger sample size, and failed to find any evidence for the effect.

And while Gervais knew that the original study wasn’t rigorous, he couldn’t help but feel a twinge of discomfort.

“Intellectually, I could say the original data weren’t strong,” he says. “That’s very different from the human, personal reaction to it. Which is like, ‘Oh, shit, there’s going to be a published failure to replicate my most cited finding that’s gotten the most media attention.’ You start worrying about stuff like, ‘Are there going to be career repercussions? Are people going to think less of my other work and stuff I’ve done?’”

Gervais’s story is familiar: Many of us fear we’ll be seen as less competent, less trustworthy, if we admit wrongness. Even when we can see our own errors — which, as outlined above, is not easy to do — we’re hesitant to admit it.

But turns out this assumption is false. As Adam Fetterman, a social psychologist at the University of Texas El Paso, has found in a few studies, wrongness admission isn’t usually judged harshly. “When we do see someone admit that they are wrong, the wrongness admitter is seen as more communal, more friendly,” he says. It’s almost never the case, in his studies, “that when you admit you’re wrong, people think you are less competent.”

Sure, there might be some people who will troll you for your mistakes. There might be a mob on Twitter that converges in order to shame you. Some moments of humility could be humiliating. But this fear must be vanquished if we are to become less intellectually arrogant and more intellectually humble.

Humility can’t just come from within — we need environments where it can thrive

But even if you’re motivated to be more intellectually humble, our culture doesn’t always reward it.

The field of psychology, overall, has been reckoning with a “replication crisis” where many classic findings in the science don’t hold up under rigorous scrutiny. Incredibly influential textbook findings in psychology — like the “ego depletion” theory of willpower or the “marshmallow test” — have been bending or breaking.

I’ve found it fascinating to watch the field of psychology deal with this. For some researchers, the reckoning has been personally unsettling. “I’m in a dark place,” Michael Inzlicht, a University of Toronto psychologist, wrote in a 2016 blog post after seeing the theory of ego depletion crumble before his eyes. “Have I been chasing puffs of smoke for all these years?”

What I’ve learned from reporting on the “replication crisis” is that intellectual humility requires support from peers and institutions. And that environment is hard to build.

“What we teach undergrads is that scientists want to prove themselves wrong,” says Simine Vazire, a psychologist and journal editor who often writes and speaks about replication issues. “But, ‘How would I know if I was wrong?’ is actually a really, really hard question to answer. It involves things like having critics yell at you and telling you that you did things wrong and reanalyze your data.”

And that’s not fun. Again: Even among scientists — people who ought to question everything — intellectual humility is hard. In some cases, researchers have refused to concede their original conclusions despite the unveiling of new evidence. (One famous psychologist under fire recently told me angrily, “I will stand by that conclusion for the rest of my life, no matter what anyone says.”)

Psychologists are human. When they reach a conclusion, it becomes hard to see things another way. Plus, the incentives for a successful career in science push researchers to publish as many positive findings as possible.

There are two solutions — among many — to make psychological science more humble, and I think we can learn from them.

One is that humility needs to be built into the standard practices of the science. And that happens through transparency. It’s becoming more commonplace for scientists to preregister — i.e., commit to — a study design before even embarking on an experiment. That way, it’s harder for them to deviate from the plan and cherry-pick results. It also makes sure all data is open and accessible to anyone who wants to conduct a reanalysis.

That “sort of builds humility into the structure of the scientific enterprise,” Chabris says. “We’re not all-knowing and all-seeing and perfect at our jobs, so we put [the data] out there for other people to check out, to improve upon it, come up with new ideas from and so on.” To be more intellectually humble, we need to be more transparent about our knowledge. We need to show others what we know and what we don’t.

And two, there needs to be more celebration of failure, and a culture that accepts it. That includes building safe places for people to admit they were wrong, like the Loss of Confidence Project.

But it’s clear this cultural change won’t come easily.

“In the end,” Rohrer says, after getting a lot of positive feedback on the project, “we ended up with just a handful of statements.”

We need a balance between convictions and humility

There’s a personal cost to an intellectually humble outlook. For me, at least, it’s anxiety.

When I open myself up to the vastness of my own ignorance, I can’t help but feel a sudden suffocating feeling. I have just one small mind, a tiny, leaky boat upon which to go exploring knowledge in a vast and knotty sea of which I carry no clear map.

Why is it that some people never seem to wrestle with those waters? That they stand on the shore, squint their eyes, and transform that sea into a puddle in their minds and then get awarded for their false certainty? “I don’t know if I can tell you that humility will get you farther than arrogance,” says Tenelle Porter, a University of California Davis psychologist who has studied intellectual humility.

Of course, following humility to an extreme end isn’t enough. You don’t need to be humble about your belief that the world is round. I just think more humility, sprinkled here and there, would be quite nice.

“It’s bad to think of problems like this like a Rubik’s cube: a puzzle that has a neat and satisfying solution that you can put on your desk,” says Michael Lynch, a University of Connecticut philosophy professor. Instead, it’s a problem “you can make progress at a moment in time, and make things better. And that we can do — that we can definitely do.”

For a democracy to flourish, Lynch argues, we need a balance between convictions — our firmly held beliefs — and humility. We need convictions, because “an apathetic electorate is no electorate at all,” he says. And we need humility because we need to listen to one another. Those two things will always be in tension.

The Trump presidency suggests there’s too much conviction and not enough humility in our current culture.

“The personal question, the existential question that faces you and I and every thinking human being, is, ‘How do you maintain an open mind toward others and yet, at the same time, keep your strong moral convictions?’” Lynch says. “That’s an issue for all of us.”

To be intellectually humble doesn’t mean giving up on the ideas we love and believe in. It just means we need to be thoughtful in choosing our convictions, be open to adjusting them, seek out their flaws, and never stop being curious about why we believe what we believe. Again, that’s not easy

#### Fairness- Debate is a game one winner one loser, speech times , tabula rasa judging, concessions etc… all prove it’s an intrinsic good. Skirting negative research and preparations gives the aff an unfair advantage which should be rejected

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**Affirming individual survival maintains an economy of recognition – that engenders neoliberalism by letting corporations and government alike off the hook for social responsibility and making collective political change structurally impossible.**

**Dean 16** [Jodi, Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges and Erasmus Professor of the Humanities in the Faculty of Philosophy at Erasmus University in Rotterdam, *Crowds and Party*, Verso (Brookyn, NY): 2016, p. 33-35]

Silva’s account of a transition to adulthood marked not by “entry into social groups and institutions but rather the explicit rejection of them” provides a poignant rejoinder to Sennett.19 One man tells Silva that “the hardest part about being an adult is finding a real fucking job.”20 People aren’t lacking a narrative for adulthood. Capitalism presents adulthood as an individual project. For the young working people Silva interviewed, individualism equals dignity. They tell heroic tales of self-sufficiency, turning inward as they manage feelings of betrayal, accept flexibility and flux, and buttress their sense of being utterly alone. Although the dependencies of the welfare state and corporate bureaucracy that Lasch associates with the therapeutic sensibility have been dismantled and replaced by a harsher, more competitive capitalism, **therapeutic language** remains the vocabulary through which to account for individual success and failure. Instead of the jettisoning of the past that Lasch and Sennett observe, Silva’s subjects embrace the past as they narrate the challenges they have had to overcome in order to realize their authentic selves. Understood in terms of familial and personal experiences, the past provides an open field of explanations for hardship, failure, and the diminution of what they see as success. Unlike Lasch’s empty narcissists, Silva’s young adults have lives of inner purpose—surviving on their own in a context where the odds are against them. They struggle with illness and battle with addiction. They overcome dysfunctional families and past relationships. **The fight to survive is the key feature of an identity imagined as dignified and heroic because it has to produce itself by itself**. Silva’s young adults point to an imaginary identity beyond the rugged individualist and the narcissistic gamesman: the **survivor**. Unlike the symbolic identity of institutions (the place from which one sees oneself as acting), imaginary identity is the image one adopts of oneself. Since so many of Silva’s informants feel they have had to do it all by themselves, in contexts of poverty and diminishing opportunity, they take the fact of their survival as the morally significant fact: making it on one’s own is what bestows dignity. Some of the white survivors Silva interviews resent “socialists” like US President Barack Obama for trying to take away their last best thing, the special something that is all they have left, namely, the dignity they have because they are completely self-reliant. **The black survivors**, too, **narrate their experiences in individual rather than collective terms**. **They**, too, **seek to hold on to the only person they can count on—themselves**. Betrayed by schools, the labor market, and the government, Silva’s working-class informants in general feel “completely alone, responsible for their own fates and dependent on outside help at their peril.” For them, surviving means internalizing the painful lesson that “being an adult means trusting no one by yourself.”21 What Sennett lauded as a repudiation of dependence appears in Silva’s account as a deep skepticism of solidarity. Reliance on other people requires acknowledging one’s insufficiency as an individual, one’s inability to survive alone. The hostility to the needy expressed by some of Silva informants suggests a defense against their own need. **Hostility lets them displace their need onto others and thereby shore up a fragile and impossible individuality**. Having learned that they can’t rely on anyone, these young working-class adults try to numb their sense of betrayal by affirming the worst cultural scripts of individualism, personal responsibility, and self-reliance, hardening themselves to the world around them. Their hostility to various forms of government intervention, particularly affirmative action, makes them ideal supports for neoliberal capitalism. Incidentally, those of us who write and circulate critical exposés—stories of governmental corruption, university failure, and corporate malfeasance—may not be helping our cause. We may be affirming what some in the working class already know to be true: they are being betrayed. Likewise countering Sennett’s happy rendering of the repudiation of dependence, Carrie M. Lane’s research on white-collar technology workers in Dallas situates the emphasis on individual responsibility in the context of wide-scale layoffs and unemployment.22 Insecurity is a primary feature of the lives of these tech workers. Most alternate through contract positions of varying duration, unemployment, and selfemployment.23 Lane notes how the technology workers she interviewed embrace a “career management” ideology that casts “insecurity as an empowering alternative to dependence on a single employer.”24 They construe loyalty as a thing of the past: since everyone is a victim of economic forces beyond their control, neither companies nor employees owe each other anything. Owners and workers both want to make money however they can. No one should expect a company to provide employment security or opportunities for professional development. Such an expectation indicates a childish attitude of dependence. According to one executive, “To give my employees job security would be to disempower them and relieve them of the responsibility that they need to feel for their own success.”25 Laid-off and job-seeking tech workers adopt the corresponding individualist mindset: success comes from doing “whatever it takes” to get by, get through, get that next job. The survivor is a compelling identity under conditions of extreme competition and inequality. It validates surviving by any means necessary. Survival is its own reward. Setbacks and lapses are new challenges, ultimately greater proof of one’s survival skills. Popular culture provides a wide array of survivors to emulate (as well as examples of those who have been unable to get themselves together): from Katniss in The Hunger Games, to the winners of uncountable reality television competitions, to games like Day Z and Fallout, to victims of illness or crime. **Emotions of anger, suspicion, and defensiveness are justified**—one can rely only on oneself—**and potentially useful as the psychic weapons that can help maintain an impossible individuality**. **The survivor is a figure** not for a culture of narcissism but for a psychotic culture. If narcissistic culture is characterized by the dislodging of symbolic authority, psychotic culture is characterized by its foreclosure.26 In brief, Lacan defines psychosis in terms of the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father or master signifier. That the master signifier is foreclosed means that it does not stabilize meaning; the signifying chain lacks an anchor that can hold it together. The generalized loss of symbolic power impacts the subject such that he feels this now-missing authority to be all the closer, more powerful, and intrusive. In a psychotic culture, then, **mistrust is pervasive**, all-consuming. **Each confronts power directly and alone**. To compensate for the missing symbolic authority, the psychotic turns to the imaginary. He positions himself in relation to a “captivating image,” perhaps of one whom he hates, admires, or fears.27 This imaginary other would then be a rival to defeat or destroy. The psychotic may try to mimic those around him, particularly as he grapples with intense fear and aggression. And he may also become captivated by an image of himself. Here the psychotic imagines himself not as anyone or anything in particular: I am my own worst enemy. What matters is **persistence, survival, for its own sake**. Whether rendered as **caring for oneself** or looking out for number one, the captivating image of the individual **enjoins its own maintenance**. For all their emphases on self-reliance, Silva’s interviewees nonetheless **want to be recognized**. **They want someone else to hear their stories, validate what they’ve accomplished. Communicative capitalism supplies the necessary infrastructure, the crowd of many who might view, like, or share**. Lasch’s diagnosis of cultural narcissism has lost its currency: communicative capitalist society is less narcissistic than it is psychotic, oriented via an alliance of the imaginary and the Real in the wake of the loss of the symbolic. Rather than enduring a surfeit of expertise, we are awash in multiple, conflicting, irreconcilable opinions. Unable ever fully to determine which is right, we have to decide for ourselves. Algorithms and data render social science obsolete. Power is backed by neither authority nor knowledge, appearing and manifesting instead as violence. Therapy offers neither justice nor cure. **Militarized policing—arrests and shootings without accountability or cause**—takes the place of the former; a wide array of pharmaceuticals takes the place of the latter, and when these fail there is depression, incapacity, addiction, and suicide. Finally, precarity, competition, and social networks supplant the antagonistic cooperation Lasch associates with the internal life of the corporation. Aggressive impulses need not be repressed under a veneer of cheerfulness. In the extreme inequality of communicative capitalism, multiple channels encourage their expression: hate and outrage circulate easily in affective networks.28 Nevertheless, Lasch’s attention to the forces that simultaneously command and undermine individuality remains compelling for the way it opens up the growing weight placed on the individual form. As subsequent sociological research attests, **the interiorization of this weight continues to unburden corporations and the state from social responsibilities, intensifying concentration on already stressed individuals**. **An effect has been the diminishing of expectations such that survival itself becomes the achievement worth celebrating**.

#### The affirmative’s exclusively cultural analysis of the position of blackness is a flawed starting point that marginalizes material political-economic critiques of anti-blackness—it doesn’t solve outside of the academy.

Burden-Stelly 16

(Charisse Burden-Stelly, PhD in African-American Studies from University of California Berkeley, dissertation entitled “The Modern Capitalist State and the Black Challenge: Culturalism and the Elision of Political Economy,” pgs. 192-194)

By the 1980s, there was an emergent emphasis on cultural affinity and connection in Africana studies that neglected the convergence of the material experiences in the structural organization of political economy among Blacks in the United States, Great Britain, Africa, and the Caribbean in the wake of a neoliberal agenda that produced a rollback of the state and its reformulation. This was instantiated through Reaganomics, Thatcherism, and Structural Adjustment that accompanied the collapse of the socialist/communist alternative. Despite this global restructuring, popular and scholarly understandings of American and “diasporic” Blackness did not involve a critique of political economy. An explanation of this elision will shed light on the conditions through and by which Africana studies shifted from its political, activist, and community-oriented distinctiveness to a Culturalist academic project. In other words, political economy became marginalized in the process of cultural specification of Africana studies.

Such overdetermination became evident in the “debates” taking place within the discipline focused around postcolonial studies/Black British Cultural Studies (BBCS), African American studies,1 and Afrocentricity. Each perspective posed culture as the critical site of struggle for the Black without any fundamental critique of political economy. Even though the postcolonial/Black British model ultimately became the point of reference and assumed near hegemonic status, it became highly modified and challenged by American scholars who felt that the antiessentialist, decentered, and ethnicized study of Black culture distorted and marginalized the experience of African Americans and obfuscated the peculiar dynamics of U.S. racialization. In the final analysis, the ubiquity of this “debate” further marginalized radical intellectual thought and political economic critique because the latter was deemed irrelevant to that narrow and myopic conversation based on culture. As a result, Africana studies has largely produced a cadre of alienated, privatized, culture experts who are unable to critically engage with the structural and material realities out of which the Black condition is forged. The discipline has produced a “technical intelligentsia” who is generally fit only to reproduce the “bureaucratic... apparatus” and whose “rationality... is only instrumental in character.”2 For this reason, the discipline has become unable, in its fundamentals, to engage significant issues of material abjection and political economy.

According to Martin Kilson, the maturation of Africana Studies was accomplished by and through the process of its “disciplinizing” and the proliferation of its most important innovation—Black cultural studies. Constituted by the overlapping of literary studies with psychological and societal studies, Black cultural studies provided an alternative Black ethnocentrism (Afrocentrism), and served as the primary source of enrichment of Africana Studies.3 His position is part of a debate that effectively materialized into a cultural critique of the culture concept that involved the three primary factions named above. What was being disputed and contested was not the assertion that culture was the primary means of understanding Blackness and the Black condition. Rather, the debate centered on the meaning of culture and how it should be articulated; what was at stake in particular narratives of Black/African culture; and what the effects on Africana Studies epistemology would be if one method of engaging culture was chosen over another. It questioned how culture should be operationalized, what methods and analytics best served the new disciplinary specification, and how relations of power were constituted by and instantiated through culture in the lives of Black people. The impetus for this debate was the growing influence of postcolonial studies/British cultural studies in the U.S. academy generally, and particularly of Black British Cultural Studies in Africana Studies.

The institutionalization and professionalization of Africana studies essentially collapsed the discipline into the study of Black culture. This was reified by the introduction of Black British Cultural Studies into the U.S. academy. The work and analytics of Paul Gilroy, Stuart Hall, Hazel Carby, Kobena Mercer, and other Black Britons were central to the epistemological transformation that resulted in African diaspora studies. This served in many ways to secure its legitimacy. The shift to African diaspora studies was predicated upon the appropriation and decontextualization of the tropes, concepts, and analytics of BBCS and a move away from historically and contextually specific Black American critiques of the U.S. racial state. As discussed in Chapter Four, the existent cultural specifications of Africana Studies precluded the (neo-) Marxist critique inhered in BBCS from taking root in the U.S. As a result, and unlike BBCS, African diaspora studies was unable to make an impact on Black struggles outside of the academy and on the structural issues related to these struggles. Africana studies challenged the racial epistemologies of the academy, but it fell far short of the critique raised by BBCS that systematically and deeply engaged the ways in which cultural forms were inextricably entangled with structures of domination and capitalist exploitation. Chapter Four argued that Africana studies became based on the grammar provided by American studies and the framework provided by area studies—(inter)disciplines that emerged in the context of the post-WWII proliferation of U.S. power and authority. BBCS satisfied the “need” for theory, complexity, and capaciousness in Africana studies, which had come under increasing criticism for ostensibly focusing on “victim studies” and “oppression studies.” The ready acceptance of BBCS by the American academy, though selective and partial, was due to the ways in which its abstracted articulations fit neatly within multicultural academic discourse and state pedagogy. Its cultural focus granted the state and capital reprieve from critical engagements with the material histories of racial domination, exploitation, and dispossession.

BBCS will be examined with particular focus on its critiques of the formulation of African American Studies in the U.S. academy, to elucidate the divergences in the two projects. As a counterhegemonic project, the origins and specifications of BBCS were forged as challenges to the British State and Thatcherism. When transferred to the U.S. context it proved compatible with the multicultural pedagogy of the U.S. state and became shorn of its radical critique. The following assertion by Laura Chrisman’s is particularly relevant to Africana Studies: “post-modernist intellectual concerns with language and subjectivity... infused both academia and ‘new Left’ politics to create a dominant paradigm of ‘culturalism’ for the analysis of social relations... [while] abandoning the tents and resources of socio-economic analysis.”4 Next, the Africana Studies “culture wars” will be unpacked to explicate the ways in which a narrow focus on African American Studies, Afrocentricity, and an Americanized version of BBCS foreclosed the possibility of Black radicalism and political economy critique in the discipline. Finally, the role of Culturalism will be elucidated through a critical analysis of The Black Atlantic—arguably the most important text in the shaping of African diaspora studies— written by Paul Gilroy in 1993. I argue that Gilroy’s preoccupation with the transnational routes of Black culture decentered the nation-state while reproducing its epistemological technology: Culturalism. Stated differently, while Gilroy challenged “methodological nationalism,”5 he did so through the cultural analytic of “diaspora”/Black Atlantic that reproduced the logics of nationalism and the nation-state. This explained the wide acceptance and acclaim received by The Black Atlantic and its acceptance in the U.S. academy. While The Black Atlantic was subjected to various forms of criticism, they failed to address the problematics of Culturalism.

#### Capitalism is unsustainable and causes existential environmental obliteration, global structural violence, and imperial expansion.

Robinson 18 (William, Prof. of Sociology, Global and International Studies, and Latin American Studies, @ UC-Santa Barbara, “Accumulation Crisis and Global Police State,” 2018, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0896920518757054>)

Each major episode of crisis in the world capitalist system has presented the potential for systemic change. Each has involved the breakdown of state legitimacy, escalating class and social struggles, and military conflicts, leading to a restructuring of the system, including new institutional arrangements, class relations, and accumulation activities that eventually result in a restabilization of the system and renewed capitalist expansion. The current crisis shares aspects of earlier system-wide structural crises, such as of the 1880s, the 1930s or the 1970s. But there are six interrelated dimensions to the current crisis that I believe sets it apart from these earlier ones and suggests that a simple restructuring of the system will not lead to its restabilization – that is, our very survival now requires a revolution against global capitalism (Robinson, 2014). These six dimensions, in broad strokes, present a “big picture” context in which a global police state is emerging.

First, the system is fast reaching the ecological limits of its reproduction. We have already passed tipping points in climate change, the nitrogen cycle, and diversity loss. For the first time ever, human conduct is intersecting with and fundamentally altering the earth system in such a way that threatens to bring about a sixth mass extinction (see, e.g., Foster et al., 2011; Moore, 2015). These ecological dimensions of global crisis have been brought to the forefront of the global agenda by the worldwide environmental justice movement. Communities around the world have come under escalating repression as they face off against transnational corporate plunder of their environment. While capitalism cannot be held solely responsible for the ecological crisis, it is difficult to imagine that the environmental catastrophe can be resolved within the capitalist system given capital’s implacable impulse to accumulate and its accelerated commodification of nature.

Second, the level of global social polarization and inequality is unprecedented. The richest one percent of humanity in 2016 controlled over half of the world’s wealth and 20 percent controlled 95 percent of that wealth, while the remaining 80 percent had to make do with just five percent (Oxfam, 2017). These escalating inequalities fuel capitalism’s chronic problem of overaccumulation: the TCC cannot find productive outlets to unload the enormous amounts of surplus it has accumulated, leading to chronic stagnation in the world economy (see next section). Such extreme levels of social polarization present a challenge of social control to dominant groups. As Trumpism in the United States as well as the rise of far-right and neo-fascist movements in Europe so well illustrate, cooptation also involves the manipulation of fear and insecurity among the downwardly mobile so that social anxiety is channeled towards scapegoated communities. This psychosocial mechanism of displacing mass anxieties is not new, but it appears to be increasing around the world in the face of the structural destabilization of capitalist globalization. Extreme inequality requires extreme violence and repression that lend themselves to projects of 21st century fascism.

Third, the sheer magnitude of the means of violence and social control is unprecedented, as well as the magnitude and concentrated control over the means of global communication and the production and circulation of symbols, images, and knowledge. Computerized wars, drone warfare, robot soldiers, bunker-buster bombs, a new generation of nuclear weapons, satellite surveillance, cyberwar, spatial control technology, and so forth, have changed the face of warfare, and more generally, of systems of social control and repression. We have arrived at the panoptical surveillance society, a point brought home by Edward Snowden’s revelations in 2013, and the age of thought control by those who control global flows of communication and symbolic production. If global capitalist crisis leads to a new world war the destruction would simply be unprecedented.

Fourth, we are reaching limits to the extensive expansion of capitalism, in the sense that there are no longer any new territories of significance to integrate into world capitalism and new spaces to commodify are drying up. The capitalist system is by its nature expansionary. In each earlier structural crisis, the system went through a new round of extensive expansion – from waves of colonial conquest in earlier centuries, to the integration in the late 20th and early 21st centuries of the former socialist countries, China, India and other areas that had been marginally outside the system. There are no longer any new territories to integrate into world capitalism. At the same time, the privatization of education, health, utilities, basic services, and public lands is turning those spaces in global society that were outside of capital’s control into “spaces of capital,” so that intensive expansion is reaching depths never before seen. What is there left to commodify? Where can the system now expand? New spaces have to be violently cracked open and the peoples in these spaces must be repressed by the global police state.

#### The judge should vote negative to embrace a call for abolition democracy – only the alternative creates a *praxis* for critique of anti-black violence

Mendieta 5

(Eduardo Mendieta, Professor of Philosophy at Penn State University, “Introduction” in *Abolition Democracy: Beyond Prison, Torture, and Empire* by Angela Davis, professor emerita at the University of California, Santa Cruz, in its History of Consciousness Department, pgs. 7-17 [ebook])

INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS

In her work on prisons, Davis often focuses on the insidious relationship between the prison-industrial-complex and the military industrial complex. Acknowledging these relationships is a necessary first step in developing strategies to oppose and abolish the institutions and their underlying causes.

For authentic democracy to emerge, Davis argues, abolition democracy must be enacted—the abolition of institutions that advance the dominance of any one group over any other. Abolition democracy, then, is the democracy that is to come,8 the democracy that is possible if we continue with the great abolition movements in American history, those that opposed slavery, lynching, and segregation.9 So long as the prison-industrial-complex remains, American democracy will continue to be a false one. Such a false democracy reduces people and their communities to the barest biological subsistence because it pushes them outside the law and the polity. Is this not what we plainly saw in New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina?

Such a bare existence is one that can be ignored and neglected, or extinguished with impunity precisely because it is the law that renders it expendable. Punishment has been deployed against the human body as though it were a black body. The death penalty survives not as the ultimate punishment, but because it was primarily a form of punishment against the black flesh and black freedom. And this is what is so indelibly announced in the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution. As neo-Abolitionist Joy James put it, “The Thirteenth Amendment ensnares as it emancipates. In fact, it functions as an enslaving antienslavement narrative.”

## Case

### 1NC---Reed

#### Their transhistorical K of the USFG reifies neoliberalism.

Reed 18 (Adolph, professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, “Black Politics After 2016,” February 11, 2018, https://nonsite.org/article/black-politics-after-2016)

Contemporary antiracist politics hinges on the premise that race, or racism, continues to determine the political, social, and economic circumstances of black people much as it did at the turn of the twentieth century or even earlier, under slavery. That premise underlies and drives assertions that, for example, mass incarceration is “the new Jim Crow” or a latter-day slavery. DuVernay’s documentary, 13th, all but argues explicitly that the Thirteenth Amendment’s clause exempting “punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted” from its blanket prohibition of involuntary servitude was intended to leave space for reintroducing slavery, now through mass incarceration. (To those who may object that DuVernay’s documentary does not openly make such a claim, I submit reports from several colleagues at universities in different parts of the country, including my own experience at Penn, of undergraduate students who have advanced it explicitly.) Ta-Nehisi Coates hammers incessantly on the note that racism or white supremacy is a transhistorical, unchanging, and ontological force which white people generically are either committed to, driven by, or both and that that force—an urge to engage in “the plunder of black bodies”—is the singular explanation of disadvantage, inequality, or injustice experienced by black Americans.

It is instructive that Coates and others who argue that racism remains the most potent force generating racially invidious inequalities commonly invoke superficial analogies with earlier historical moments when racial classification much more directly limited black people’s life chances. They do not attempt to explain how racism produces those outcomes in the present; the analogy stands in lieu of explanation. Michelle Alexander even acknowledges in the book that popularized the “new Jim Crow” analogy in relation to mass incarceration that, when all is said and done, it is not an accurate description of current conditions. The objective of antiracist politics is less to explain, and thereby inform strategies for addressing, the dynamics that generate and reproduce inequalities than to assert a claim that “racism” is the label that should attach to any and all injustices affecting black people. So, notwithstanding their dismissals of calls for grounding leftist strategy on challenging broad economic inequality as “class reductionist,” advocates of contemporary antiracism in fact embrace a race reductionism.

There is a logical contradiction at the core of this form of antiracist argument. Analogies to earlier historical moments when racial classification directly constrained black people’s life chances are so central to the reductionist arguments that ground antiracist politics because racism is now negatively sanctioned in contemporary American culture. It is conventional wisdom today that racism was the principal cause, or at least principal justification, of black inequality during slavery and southern Jim Crow segregation; slavery and imposed racial hierarchy are repugnant to contemporary sensibilities. That means, however, that denunciation of current practices or relations through analogies to those earlier regimes of injustice seems powerful rhetorically precisely because of a presumption that the claim is not true. For the claim to have the desired force, those making it must assume that things have changed because the charge is fundamentally a denunciation of objectionable conditions or incidents as atavistic and a call for others to regard them as such.

As Yale Law Professor James Forman, Jr. has argued, regarding the trope that mass incarceration is a new Jim Crow, such analogies both diminish the importance of the victories of the last half-century and trivialize the dangers and constraints—the concrete manifestations of explicitly racial oppression—that defined the earlier periods. The most superficial knowledge of the past and observation of the present should establish that black Americans do not live under the same restricted and perilous conditions now as in 1865, or for that matter 1965. The contention that racism singularly defines black reality is therefore not an empirical claim, even though many advancing it seem earnestly convinced that it is. It is a lament that racism persists as a force impeding black Americans’ aspirations, that no matter how successful or financially secure individual black people may be, they remain similarly subject to victimization by it. The claim carries a tacit preface: “(this incident/phenomenon/pattern makes it seem as though) nothing has changed.” In practical terms, it is an assertion that race/racism should remain the default frame of reference for discussing any and all inequalities bearing on black Americans.

Persistence of racialized patterns of inequality and expressions of open bigotry give this reductionist perspective a ring of truth, and struggle against specifically racial injustice has always been a central component of black Americans’ political activity. In addition, for at least a quarter-century political elites, the commentariat, and academics have propagated a notion that black politics consists in drawing attention to specifically racial injustices, chiefly identifying disparities. Even black concerns with issues that affect the population across the board, e.g. climate change, nonetheless seem to require assertion of a particularly racial impact. The “blacks have it worse” trope is at this point, like an ejaculation in the Catholic liturgy, a predictable reflex in political argument centered on disparity as the lone truly actionable injustice. Rhetorically, that claim is not a call to popular political action but a demand for recognition based on moral priority.

Like any ideology that gains traction, race reductionism also has a material foundation. Black ethnic politics consolidated around exponential growth of a stratum of office holders and public functionaries, and it has encouraged and reinforced development of what might be called a political economy of race-relations or diversity management. That includes a burgeoning, multibillion dollar diversity industry that extends to corporations and universities, where pursuit and monitoring of diversity is woven into human resource functions and overseen by in-house diversity professionals and administrators and freelance consultants. Insofar as diversity is valued in personnel policies, the significance of this political economy, and the ideology that emanates from and underwrites it, ranges far beyond those who work in the diversity/race relations economy directly. Diversity as a norm of fairness pervades the professional-managerial strata and ratifies an ideal of social justice that harmonizes seamlessly with market-driven neoliberalism because it combines celebration of difference and aggressive pursuit of equality of opportunity, to the exclusion of economic redistribution. This is the essential truth reflected in the subtitle of Walter Benn Michaels’s book, The Trouble with Diversity, namely that we—at least in the professional-managerial strata—have come to “love identity and ignore inequality.”

The political economy of race relations management has grown symbiotically with neoliberalism. The symbiosis may be clearest in the privatization, outsourcing, and overall retraction of social services, as claims to authentic representation of “community” voices and perspectives factor into criteria for awarding contracts and standing in policy processes that are increasingly insulated from democratic oversight and accountability. The norm of representation as embodiment of appropriate categories of identity gives private and nonprofit contractors an easy standard of legitimacy that collapses possible differences on policy issues and directions into vacant liberal proceduralism (having a “seat at the table”) and Victorian racialist mysticism (“reflecting the perspective of the X”). The symbiotic relationship shows up also in the ways that a politics grounded on identity can obfuscate dynamics of economic inequality and dispossession by rendering them in cultural terms.

Debate over displacement for upscaling redevelopment is a case in point. In opting for a language of “gentrification,” opponents of displacement, often without intending to do so, cloud a simple, straightforward dynamic—public support of private developers’ pursuit of rent-intensifying redevelopment—with cultural implications that shift critique away from the issue of using public authority to engineer upward redistribution and impose hardship on relatively vulnerable residents. Instead, discussion of gentrification slides into objections about display of privilege, and lack of recognition or respect that, notwithstanding the moral outrage that accompanies them, accept the logic of rent-intensifying redevelopment as given and demand that newcomers acknowledge and honor aboriginal habitus and practices and that the “community” be involved in the processes of upgrading. A similar racial or cultural discourse has unhelpfully shaped opposition to charterization of public education by focusing on the racial dimension of the process. The fundamental problem with Teach For America and such privatizers, after all, is not that the missionaries are mainly white and unfamiliar with native culture or even that many of them are tourists building extracurriculars for their graduate and professional school dossiers. Those are only idiosyncratically distasteful features of a particular line of attack on one front in a broader war on public goods and the idea of social solidarity in line with marketization of all human needs.

And that sort of culturalist discourse also opens opportunities for petty, and not so petty, entrepreneurship in the name of respect or recognition of the community, within the logic of neoliberalization. Race reductionism enables a sleight-of-hand in which benefits to individuals can appear to be victories for the generic racial population or community. The more deeply embedded a groupist notion of fairness or justice becomes as common sense, the more easily that sleight-of-hand works under labels like “community empowerment,” “voice,” “opportunity,” or “representation” to propel and legitimize accumulation by dispossession.

The symbiotic relation between antiracist politics and Democratic neoliberalism helps to make sense of the vitriol with which so many antiracist activists have reacted to Sanders and the renewed interest in challenging economic inequality. Notwithstanding copious evocations of the heroic period of black insurgent activism, this politics is not directed toward generating the deep and broad solidarities necessary for building an insurgent political movement. It is an insider, elite-driven interest group politics that is concerned less with reducing inequality than with establishing and maintaining what Kenneth Warren describes as “managerial authority over the nation’s Negro problem.” As West observed regarding the race relations framework’s emergence at the dawn of the twentieth century, claims to speak for black concerns in this politics do not depend on demonstration of accountability to any specific constituencies of black people. From Coates and other pundits to the many random Black Lives Matter activists those who expatiate about black Americans’ lack of interest in social-democratic politics claim interpretive authority based on the mysticism of organic racial representation and, most immediately, recognition by corporate media and elites as authentic voices.

That is a crucial context within which we should understand antiracists’ tendency to align with Wall Street Democrats in denouncing calls for general redistribution and their insistence that Trump’s victory most meaningfully expresses the depth of commitments to white supremacy, sexism, and homophobia particularly among “white working class” voters. The contention that working-class disaffection from Clintonite neoliberalism most of all expresses backlash against blacks and others is an argument, as Clinton’s snide dismissal of Sanders indicates, that economic inequality is not a central concern for blacks, women, immigrants, LGBT or transgender people. A year into the Trump presidency and unimpeded Republican control of Congress and of most state governments has confirmed what many on the left have known all along, that the right’s agenda is an all-out attack on working people, no matter what their racial and gender classifications and identities or sexual orientations. The alliance of Democratic neoliberalism and an identity-based notion of social justice has contributed to this nightmarish outcome precisely by diminishing the significance of a policy orientation that abets upward redistribution and intensifying economic inequality and racializing the working class as white losers. Doubling down on that approach, as Clintonites and race- and gender-reductionists exhort, will not effectively counter the right’s strategy. The real lesson of 2016 is that we need both to mobilize for 2018 and 2020 on a basis that focuses on the concerns and anxieties that working people share across those categories of identity and to organize for the longer term to cultivate those solidarities as part of building a movement that can change the terms of debate to pivot on how government can best provide for the security and welfare of the vast majority of the population who must work for a living. This means, among other things, that we must be confident in rejecting claims—no matter how flamboyantly adorned they are with moral posturing and evocations of past insurgencies—that black Americans or other nonwhites, immigrants, women, LGBTQ and transgender people somehow will spurn access to quality affordable housing, health care, education, secure employment with decent wages, benefits and rights and protections on the job , and high-quality public goods and services as not pertinent to them.

### 1NC---Internalize

#### The ethical care of the self is part and parcel of individualizing economic risk for the purpose of finance capital

Braun 2007. Bruce Braun is Associate Professor of Geography at the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis. His published works include The intemperate rainforest: nature, culture and power on Canada’s west coast (Minnesota, 2002), two co-edited books, Remaking reality: nature at the Millennium (Routledge, 1998) and Social nature: theory, practice, politics (Blackwell, 2001), and numerous essays on the politics of nature. “Biopolitics and the molecularization of life”. cultural geographies 2007 14: 628] VR

The result is that our ethical relation to our bodies has changed: Dilemmas about what we are, what we are capable of, what we may hope for, now have a molecular form16. Translated into the language of biopolitics, Rose argues that it is increasingly our corporeality ‘life itself’ and not just our conduct which has become subject to what Foucault called ‘technologies of self’. Ethopolitics, then, is the name Rose gives to this new ethical-political relation to our bodies, which are now defined in terms of open-ended futures. But there is more to Rose’s account than merely a shift in the target of political rationalities from the behaviour of bodies to their actual make-up; for Rose, ethopolitics also relates to crucial changes in the relation between the individual and the state. Rose develops this point in response to critics of biotechnology, for whom the molecularization of life is inescapably haunted by eugenics. With our newfound capacity to diagnose genetic conditions in embryos, for instance, we can now make choices about whether to continue a pregnancy, or to accept an embryo for implantation in IVF therapies, based upon the knowledge of future risks. For a number of critics this has raised the unsettling possibility of political rationalities directed toward eliminating ‘taints or weaknesses’ in populations, based on some bodies being calculated to have less biological worth than others. This discomfort should come as little surprise; as we are all too aware from events in the twentieth century, biopolitics, defined as the care of life, can just as readily invest in the life of the collective body through purging ‘defective’ bodies as through improving, training or selecting ‘healthy’ ones.17 It is partly in response to these anxieties that Rose spells out his account of a historical shift from a biopolitics of populations to an ethopolitics characterized by the individual management of the ‘somatic’ self. While he readily agrees that political rationalities are still organized around risks to health, he claims that the nature of these political rationalities has changed in such a way that eugenics is no longer the threat it once was. Biopolitical practices in the past, he argues, were directed toward improving the national stock, and took two forms which contained the potential for eugenics: hygienics, which was concerned with maximizing the health and productive powers of the national body in the present; and the regulation of reproduction, which was concerned with improving the national stock by eliminating risks to its wellbeing in the future. These were matters of concern for state policy, as well as for individuals who understood their biological lives (and the lives of their children) in terms of an ethical responsibility to the The present age, Rose argues, is markedly different. To begin with, it is not at all apparent that we are still in an age where the state seeks to take charge of ‘the lives of each in the name of the destiny of all’.18 In other words, for Rose the idea that the state should coordinate and manage the affairs of all sectors of society that it should attach importance to the ‘fitness’ of the national body en masse has fallen into disrepute, 10 cultural geographies 14(1) since the question of ‘fitness’ is no longer framed in terms of a struggle between national populations, but instead posed in economic terms, such as the cost of days off from work that are caused by ill health. Hence, when it comes to national health, the state seeks to ‘enable’ or ‘facilitate’ the health of individuals, rather than govern bodies in any direct way. The difference between ‘old’ eugenics and what some have today labelled ‘liberal’ eugenics, then, can be seen as the difference between state-led programmes that in the past sought to produce a particular population with particular traits and capabilities, and the ethical decisions of individuals in the present, who are exercising ‘choice’ in reproductive matters. Although forms of pastoral power clearly shape these reproductive choices, the state remains neutral. For Rose, this is a crucial difference, and symptomatic of a larger shift, whereby health is increasingly a matter of individual rather than state responsibility and citizens are asked to take responsibility for securing their own wellbeing, through such things as purchasing private health insurance, being informed citizens, actively investigating health conditions, joining with others in support groups, contributing to lobby groups and seeking genetic counselling. It is here, at the intersection of the molecularization of life with the individualization of risk, that Rose locates ethopolitics as the dominant biopolitical regime of the present. Within such a biopolitical order, he argues, individuals are presented with new ways of rendering their bodies to themselves in thought and language, making judgements about them, and ultimately acting upon them, whether these decisions are based on DNA samples from amniotic fluid, in the case of reproductive health, or susceptibility to Alzheimer’s, due to the presence or absence of particular genes. Thus, the individual who ‘takes responsibility for her health’ is at the same time the individual who thinks her body through its ‘genetic inheritance’, an inheritance to be managed wisely or potentially improved. This government of the genetic self is thus decidedly not about following general programmes, aimed at the population at large, but about understanding and making wise choices about the risks that are peculiar to one’s self. Risk becomes ‘individualized’; the individual becomes ‘intrinsically somatic’; and ethical practices ‘increasingly take the body as a key site for work on the self’19. Within the social sciences and humanities this formulation of the biopolitical present predominates, as is evident in a great deal of work on the social and cultural aspects of biomedicine and biotechnology. From anthropologists and sociologists, for example, we learn that the molecularization of life and the individualization of risk have given rise to new forms of identity and sociality around disease and risk.20 Individuals are said to increasingly recognize the ‘self’ as the bearer of this or that genetic risk, around which daily routines and future plans must be prudently organized. Likewise, researchers have begun to attend to the myriad of ways that our genetic lives are lived, and ethical decisions about ‘life itself’ are made, within complex networks of activists, scientists, doctors, politicians and corporate interests that are clustered around particular ‘risks’.21 In many of these accounts the Internet looms large, providing novel possibilities for the sharing of biomedical knowledge and life experience among lay advocates, scientists and clinicians, and for forging translocal communities around particular genetic identities.22 These new de-territorialized ‘body-geographies’ can be seen to challenge local cultures of health and local etiologies of disease, while also providing space for the proliferation of alternative body-knowledges, or for the emergence and organization of new demands on state and capital by individuals and collectives. For Rose and Novas, such practices provide further evidence of the ‘making up’ of the biological citizen from below, rather than the shaping of citizens by the disciplinary power of the state.23 We should not take this to mean that power relations are absent from ethopolitics. Indeed, one of the crucial questions to emerge from Rose’s account is precisely what it means to ‘exercise choice’ in the self-management of the body. What defines choice? And who is this ethopolitical subject who understands their body in such terms? Drawing upon Dean’s discussion of the formation of neo-liberal subjects, we might begin with an initial observation that with the shift to private health insurance and away from the providential state we are in a sense compelled to be subjects who ‘make choices’ about our health.24 As Deborah Heath, Rayna Rapp and Karen-Sue Taussig put it, we are asked to be good genetic citizens, which is to say that we are obliged to wisely manage our own lives through exercising choice.25 In the absence of other options for securing health, such as those provided by a providential state, we must make our biological life our life’s work. But this presents us with a further range of problems. On the one hand we are faced with growing populations undocumented workers, the working poor who are excluded from this ethopolitical order; that is, those who are denied the political right to health, or who lack the resources that might enable them to ‘choose’ in short, who cannot be the neo-liberal subjects that Rose presupposes. For these subjects the biological self is a precarious entity bare life, exposed to death rather than an object for personal reconstruction. On the other hand, we find that as soon as we look carefully at the social and medical field in which the ‘somatic’ self exercises choice, we find it delimited by numerous parameters: not only traversed by countless forms of pastoral power all those ‘professionals of vitality’, counsellors, therapists and ethicists, not to mention geneticists and physicians, who are there to guide our decisions but shaped by what Catherine Waldby has called the production of ‘biovalue’.26 Indeed, if molecular biology and genetics have reconfigured the body in terms of information, and if the ethical care of the self occurs within this field of informatics, then the question arises of what sort of bioinformation is being produced, to what end, and for whom. It is no secret that the driving force behind bioinformatics today is finance capital, such that the future of any given field of research, the sequencing of this or that genome, or the data-mining of this or that genomic database, more often than not, flourishes or perishes depending on stock values, and those stock values in turn are tied to the actual or proclaimed successes or failures of research results. Moreover, research is most likely to occur if results can be transformed into products (geneticbased drugs or therapies, for instance), or if it can be mobilized as part of some product development pipeline. Not just anyone can participate in building this informational field, despite the organizing of advocacy groups and online medical communities. As Eugene Thacker notes, life at the molecular level is only knowable through complex and expensive apparatuses electron microscopes, ultracentrifuges and x-ray diffraction and through the expensive, computer-driven analysis of genebanks. The development 12 cultural geographies 14(1) of cures and preventive practices is exorbitantly expensive, and inaccessible to nonspecialists.27 And the patenting of bio-information means that the right to use such information is constrained by property and law. Not only does this modern day form of enclosure mean that the field of ‘choice’ is circumscribed, but biotechnology’s high capitalization and specialization means that immense challenges stand in the way of any sort of informed critique and public debate.

### Solvency — 1NC

#### Their musical resistance is definitively coopted and reinforces racism.

Adelt ‘7 (Ulrich; University of Iowa; *BLACK, WHITE AND BLUE: RACIAL POLITICS OF BLUES MUSIC IN THE 1960S*; <https://ir.uiowa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1313&context=etd>; accessed 10/17/19; MSCOTT)

My dissertation is a foray into blues music's intricate web of racial taxonomies, an aspect that has been neglected by most existing studies of the genre. In particular, I am interested in significant changes that took place in the 1960s under which blues was reconfigured from "black" to "white" in its production and reception while simultaneously retaining a notion of authenticity that remained deeply connected with constructions of "blackness." In the larger context of the Civil Rights Movement and the burgeoning counterculture, audiences for blues music became increasingly "white" and European. In their romantic embrace of a poverty of choice, "white" audiences and performers engaged in discourses of authenticity and in the commodification, racialization and gendering of sounds and images as well as in the confluence of blues music’s class origins. I argue that as "white" people started to listen to "black" blues, essentialist notions about "race" remained unchallenged and were even solidified in the process. By the end of the 1960s, moments of cross-racial communication and a more flexible approach to racialized sounds had been thwarted by nostalgia for and a reification of essentialist categories. This marked the emergence of a conservative blues culture that has continued into the present. Individual chapters focus on key figures, events and institutions that exemplify blues music’s racial politics and transnational movements of the 1960s.

### Ferguson – 1NC

#### The 1AC’s investment in a minoritarian protest within the academic confines of debate is nothing more than the re-instantiation of power. The state, capital, and the academy itself hegemonically invests in the representation of unrest in order to pacify resistance and re-weaponize protest against the possibility for revolutionary subjectivity – turning case.

Ferguson’12 (Roderick A. Ferguson is the co-director of the Racialized Body research cluster at UIC. Prior to his appointment there, he was professor of race and critical theory in the Department of American Studies at the University of Minnesota, serving as chair of the department from 2009 to 2012. In the fall of 2013, he was the Old Dominion Visiting Faculty for the Council of the Humanities and the Center for African American Studies at Princeton University. In 2004, he was Scholar in Residence for the “Queer Locations” Seminar at the University of California’s Humanities Research Institute in Irvine, California. From 2007 to 2010, he was associate editor of the American Studies Association’s flagship journal [American Quarterly](https://www.americanquarterly.org/). “Reorder of Things : The University and Its Pedagogies of Minority Difference” 2012. Pgs. 5-8)

The history of the U.S. ethnic and women’s studies protests presents the transition from economic, epistemological, and political stability to the pos­sibility for revolutionary social ruptures and subjectivities. For instance, the San Francisco State student strikes of 1969 advocated a “Third World revolution” that would displace and provide an alternative to racial in­ equality on that campus. That same year, 269 similar protests erupted across the country. 3 At Rutgers, black students took over the main educa­tional building, renaming it “Liberation Hall.” At the University of Texas at Austin, a student organization called Afro Americans for Black Libera­tion “insisted on converting the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library to a black studies building and renaming it for Malcolm X.” 4 Inspired by the black power movement, Chicano students would also form “the United Mexican American Students, the Mexican American Student Associa­tion, and MECha, Movimiento Estudiantil Chicano de Aztlán, while oth­ ers in San Antonio founded the Mexican American Youth Organization, MAYO.” 5 Those students would also begin to demand Chicano studies courses and departments. Similarly, in 1969 American Indian activists took over Alcatraz Island and claimed it as Indian territory, with hopes of building a cultural center and museum. 6 And in 1970, the first women’s studies programs would be established at San Diego State University and at SUNY-Buffalo. While the state governments in California and Wisconsin called out the National Guard on students advocating for ethnic studies, systems of power also responded to these protests by attempting to manage that transition, in an attempt to prevent economic, epistemological, and political crises from achieving revolutions that could redistribute social and material relations. Instead, those systems would work to ensure that these crises were recomposed back into state, capital, and academy. Whereas modes of power once disciplined difference in the universalizing names of canon­icity, nationality, or economy, other operations of power were emerging that would discipline through a seemingly alternative regard for difference and through a revision of the canon, national identity, and the market. This theorization of power converges with and diverges from Foucault’s own observations, converging with him through an emphasis on the strate­gic nature of power relations. For instance, recall his argument about power in the first volume of The History of Sexuality, where he argues for power’s “intentional and nonsubjective” nature. 7 According to Foucault, whatever intelligibility power relations may possess, it “is not because they are the effect of another instance that ‘explains’ them, but rather because they are imbued, through and through, with calculation.” 8 Elaborating on the strategic but nonindividualized character of power, Foucault wrote that “there is no power that is exercised without a series of aims and objec­tives. But this does not mean it results from the choice or decision of an individual subject.” 9 The Reorder of Things builds on this element of Foucault’s theorization by looking at how state, capital, and academy saw minority insurgence as a site of calculation and strategy, how those institutions began to see minority difference and culture as positivities that could be part of their own “series of aims and objectives.” As formations increasingly character­ized by the presence of minority difference, state, capital, and academy— in different but intersecting ways— began to emerge as hegemonic processes that were “especially alert and responsive to the alternatives and opposi­tions which [questioned] or [threatened their] dominance.” 10 Hence, this book looks at the diverse but interlocking ways in which state, capital, and academy produced an adaptive hegemony where minority difference was concerned. In keeping with Foucault, the book eschews an individualized notion of power, preferring instead to regard power as a complex and multisited social formation. Rather than being embodied in an individual or a group, power— Foucault says— is a set of relations in which “the logic is perfectly clear, the aims decipherable, and yet it is often the case that no one is there to have invented them, and few who can be said to have formulated them.” 11 In this book, the impersonal nature of power is derived from the ways in which hegemonic investments in minority difference and culture are distrib­uted across institutional and subjective terrains during and after the period of social unrest, terrains such as universities and colleges, corporations, social movements, media, and state practices. The book also uses the category “power” in the spirit of Foucault’s own implicit belief that complex situations deserve a name. Even though the name is ill-fitting, it is the “closest [we] can get to it.” 12 Addressing the cat­achresis called power, Foucault says, “power establishes,” “power invests,” “power takes hold.” 13 Furthermore, in his description of biopower, he writes, “Power would no longer be dealing simply with legal subjects over whom the ultimate dominion was death, but with living beings, and the mastery it would be able to exercise over them would have to be applied to the level of life itself.” 14 For Foucault, power becomes like a character in a story, a code name for the “multiplicity of force relations.” 15 Like Fou­cault, I use power as shorthand for a plurality of relations, arguing that if power is the “name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society,” 16 then power in the age of minority social movements becomes the new name for calculating and arranging minority difference. While The Reorder of Things attempts to rigorously attend to how dominant modes of power in the post– World War II moment utilized minority difference, the book does not reduce the “the political and cul­ ural initiatives” of the social movements— those grand champions of minority culture— to the terms of hegemony. Indeed, as part of its own archival investigation, the book attempts to unearth those elements of the social movements that were antagonistic to the terms of hegemony, giving attention to how university and presidential administrations in the sixties attempted to beguile minorities with promises of excellence and uplift. Thus, as part of its investigation of the changing networks of power, the book analyzes how dominant institutions attempted to reduce the initiatives of oppositional movements to the terms of hegemony. This book diverges from Foucault as it takes racial formations as the genealogy of power’s investment in various forms of minority difference and culture while extending Foucault’s emphasis on the productive— and not simply the repressive— capacities of power. From the social movements of the fifties and sixties until the present day, networks of power have at­ tempted to work through and with minority difference and culture, trying to redirect originally insurgent formations and deliver them to the norma­tive ideals and protocols of state, capital, and academy. In this new strategic situation, hegemonic power denotes the disembodied and abstract promo­tion of minority representation without fully satisfying the material and social redistribution of minoritized subjects, particularly where people of color are concerned. One of the central claims of this book, then, is that the struggles taking place on college campuses because of the student pro­tests were inspirations for power in that moment, inspiring it to substitute redistribution for representation, indeed encouraging us to forget how rad­ical movements promoted the inseparability of the two.

# 2NC

## T

### 2NC- TVA

#### Here’s ev

Firat Cengiz 20. School of Law and Social Justice, University of Liverpool. "The conflict between market competition and worker solidarity: moving from consumer to a citizen welfare standard in competition law". Cambridge Core. 10-8-2020. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-studies/article/conflict-between-market-competition-and-worker-solidarity-moving-from-consumer-to-a-citizen-welfare-standard-in-competition-law/6E783D1FC4BAB5605DFABCD17FBE3F35

Introduction

This paper offers a critical investigation of the law and economics of competition law enforcement in conflicts between workers and employers in the European Union (hereinafter EU) and the US. In such cases competition law comes into direct conflict with the principle of worker solidarity: according to the principle of market competition individuals are expected to take independent economic decisions and actions, whereas workers need to take collective economic actions and decisions to protect their interests. This conflict is particularly obvious in the context of the so-called gig economy,1 in which employers keep casualised workers at legal arms’ length to reduce labour and regulatory costs.2 If gig workers take collective action against their working conditions, they might face attack from competition law, because legally they might be considered independent service providers, rather than workers.3

The legal conundrum facing gig workers has become an increasingly popular subject in the law and economics literature.4 Nevertheless, the more fundamental question of how the enforcement of competition rules affects the overall position of workers beyond the limited case of the gig economy remains largely unexplored. This paper aims to investigate this broader and more fundamental question. In order to provide a sufficiently global answer, the paper focuses on the legal positions of the EU and US, as the leading competition law jurisdictions and primary competition policy exporters.5 The EU–US comparison shows that despite the slightly different legal tests applied in these polities, competition rules constitute nearly equally disciplining mechanisms against collective worker action on either side of the Atlantic.

This paper also makes an original contribution to the emerging debate on whether and how competition law can contribute to wealth equality between citizens in the post-2008 crisis economy. The existing debate on the competition law–equality relationship takes the ‘consumer welfare’ standard as its main reference point: it focuses exclusively on the distribution of wealth between consumers and producers; as a result, it overlooks the production process that takes place before consumers meet products and services, and the position of workers within it.6 This is a natural result of competition law's reliance on a limited area of neoclassical economics called ‘equilibrium economics’ that understands efficiency exclusively as a market mechanism in which the price manifests itself where supply meets demand.7 Departing from the mainstream competition law and economics methodology, this paper builds its investigation on a holistic theoretical foundation, looking beyond equilibrium economics at labour exploitation theory as established in neoclassical as well as Marxian models. This analysis shows that despite standing at opposing ends of the political spectrum and whilst having some fundamental differences, Marxist and neoclassical models agree that collective worker action is economically beneficial and socially necessary. As a result, a critical analysis of the current legal situation on both sides of the Atlantic in light of this holistic framework illustrates how competition law's hostility towards collective worker action is not only unjust but also economically unsound.

This paper demonstrates that the key problem in competition law's treatment of labour stems from the application of the consumer welfare standard in cases involving the competition–solidarity conflict without paying any attention to the idiosyncratic qualities of labour that render it naturally open to exploitation. Similarly, the consumer welfare standard overlooks the fact that consumers and workers are essentially the same group of people and one's welfare cannot be increased or decreased without affecting the other's.8 Even if worker exploitation could result in reduced labour costs and decreased prices, this cannot be deemed efficient as it reduces the workers’ welfare and results in broader negative socio-economic effects. Similarly, collective worker action resulting in higher labour costs and potentially higher prices cannot automatically be deemed inefficient, because although this might increase the prices consumers pay, they benefit from higher wages and better working conditions in their position as workers. As a result of this critical analysis, the paper proposes an original and more inclusive ‘citizen welfare’ standard that takes into account the economic effects of anti-competitive behaviour on workers as well as consumers. The citizen welfare standard could also potentially be applied in other contexts to solve long-standing conflicts between competition and other policy objectives, such as industrial, environmental and social policy objectives,9 although this paper primarily focuses on the application of citizen welfare to the competition–solidarity conflict.

The structure of the paper is as follows: the next section provides an opening discussion of competition law, consumer welfare and equality. This is followed by a discussion of the economic theory of labour exploitation. Then, the paper investigates how competition law approaches the competition–solidarity conflict in the EU and the US. The fourth section critically discusses the EU and US legal positions in light of economic theory. This section also develops the citizen welfare approach as an alternative to consumer welfare for the resolution of the competition–solidarity conflict. This is finally followed with conclusions. Regarding terminology, this paper uses the term ‘worker’ (rather than employee) as a non-legal, generic term encompassing all individuals who make a living by providing labour power as a production factor in the production process of goods and services. Similarly, the term ‘labour’ is used to refer to the contribution of the workers to the production process as an abstract human factor. However, if the courts or authorities in question use a different term (such as employee) in a specific case, the paper uses the same term in the discussion of that specific case

# 1NR---Round 5

## K---Capitalism

### 1NR---Impact

#### Only our method solves the weaponization of whiteness towards the consumption of Black flesh.

Gomer 17

(Justin Gomer, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor of American Studies at California State University, Long Beach, ““They should have called Katrina ‘Gone with the Wind’”: Charles Burnett’s Quiet As Kept and the Neoliberal Racial State,” *Souls: A Critical Journal of Black Politics, Culture, and Society*, 19:2, pgs. 165-168)

The attack on welfare and the explosion of prisons in the United States reveals the manner in which the neoliberal state is not merely concerned, as many contend, with the restoration of class power, but as a political project neoliberalism is equally if not primarily interested in white supremacy.17 It is more accurate, therefore, to think in terms of the neoliberal racial state. While this characterization does not, on the one hand, contradict the understanding of neoliberalism as a political project, it marks an important distinction in highlighting white supremacy as central to the logic of neoliberalism. While neoliberal policies have decimated labor power and eroded social safety net programs that plenty of poor and working-class whites rely upon, those ends were accomplished through framing government spending not simply as ineffective, but as benefitting undeserving lazy African Americans. Consider cuts to welfare, for example. Certainly those reductions in state services hurt a significant number of whites who relied on those entitlements. However, mobilizing support to pursue punitive cuts was won through framing the recipients of those entitlements as, in the case of Ronald Reagan, lazy, Cadillac-driving black women. The neoliberal racial state, then, allows us to understand the ways in which larger class oppression is actualized through antiblack racism.

Moreover, the draconian cuts to welfare spending coupled with the hyper-incarceration of poor blacks beginning in the 1970s illustrate the historical specificity of the neoliberal racial state. As Waquant demonstrates, until the middle of the 19th century, the oppression of African Americans was accomplished largely through their enslavement. From the hundred years between abolition and the end of the civil rights era, the racial terrorism of Jim Crow in the South and the ghettoization of the “Fordist Metropolis” in the North subordinated blacks.18 The rise of the neoliberal racial state brought with it punitive cuts to welfare programs which led to “decoupling crime from punishment so as to establish that the irruption of the penal state...[as] a response not to criminal insecurity but to the social insecurity spawned by the precarisation of wage labour and to the ethnic anxiety generated by the destabilization of established hierarchies.”19

It is important to note that the rise of the neoliberal racial state depended upon the racial project of colorblindness. As Michael Omi and Howard Winant argue, “Neoliberalism was at its core a racial project as much as a capital accumulation project. Its central racial component was colorblind racial ideology.”20 Colorblindness provides the racial logic of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism’s rise in the United States was built upon a foundation of anti-government sentiment that had increasingly solidified among Americans as the seventies progressed. The primary contributors to this ethos were, on the one hand, the stagflated economy of the 1970s that classical Keynesianism seemed incapable of curing. Perhaps more important, however, was a growing animus toward federal and state governments as a result of legal and social battles over civil rights programs—affirmative action and court-ordered busing, in particular. It is no coincidence, in other words, that a significant portion of the American public became sympathetic to neoliberalism’s small government ideology at precisely the moment when many of them, whites in particular, felt the government was doing too much to enforce black civil rights. Colorblind discourse provided the rhetorical ammunition for opponents of black civil rights. It allowed whites the opportunity to both oppose busing and affirmative action while aligning themselves with the legacy and language of the civil rights movement. They were not racists, so the logic went, they merely were supporting Martin Luther King’s dream of a society in which people were judged “not by the color of their skin, but by the content of their character.”

Yet, colorblindness provides more than a politically correct discourse to oppose racial equality. By prohibiting considerations of race in addressing racial inequality it aims to eliminate the government from racial matters altogether. In its place, as with neoliberalism’s prescription for economic policy, colorblindness offers white supremacy through race-neutral market logic as the solution to government intervention. As Milton Friedman insists in Capitalism and Freedom, the market supposedly punishes discrimination because the bigot who refuses to work alongside or sell or buy his goods to African Americans, limits his or her choice and there- fore depresses his wages or artificially inflates the price he must pay for goods.21 For Friedman, then, the free-market is a colorblind arbiter of equality. Thomas Sowell is even more adamant regarding the markets ability to eliminate discrimination. According to Sowell, discriminatory actions depend exclusively on the “costs of doing so. Where those costs are very high,” Sowell argues, “even very prejudiced or biased people may engage in little or no discrimination.”22 In reality, neoliberal policies like those advocated by Friedman and Sowell have further impoverished black communities and by reframing the state as the protector of the market rather than of civil rights, have undermined racial justice. Take the 2008 financial crisis, for example. Decades of deregulation begat rampant recklessly high-risk investing by the financial industry which enabled predatory financial instruments like sub-prime mortgages to flourish. African Americans, already on the short end of rising wealth inequality, were far more likely to find themselves, or be deliberately driven into on the basis of race, in the case of Wells Fargo, the adjustable rate mortgages and other sub-prime loans at the center of the housing bubble. The colorblind market that neoliberal economists like Friedman and Sowell defend as, in theory, an arbiter of racial justice has in practice targeted those the market deems most vulnerable—poor communities of color—while avoiding race-conscious rhetoric.

Colorblindness is, in other words, the racial ideology of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism, in the American context, is just as much a racial project as it is an economic one. Its discourse offered free-market colorblind “solutions” to the civil rights battles of the seventies just as it provided economic “solutions” to a sluggish economy. Neoliberalism is therefore a racial and project by which the upward mobilization of wealth and the immobilization of blacks at society’s bottom is secured through a discourse of “free market fundamentalism.” This belies the actual practice of what Jamie Peck describes as the “market as parasite,” as opposed to the “market as predator.” According to Peck, “Neoliberalism not only has, but must, parasitically coexist with (or off) other state forms and social formations...”23 In highlighting the falsity of the state versus market dichotomy, Peck clarifies neoliberalism’s goal—not to eliminate the state, but to determine the uses to which the market puts the state and to what degree the state decides what constitutes a market. For example, in January 2013 both Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and GEO Group, the nation’s two largest for-profit private prisons corporations, began converting from traditional class-C Corporations to Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) in order to slash their effective tax rate to nearly zero.24 What organization facilitated this transition? The Internal Revenue Service (IRS). CCA and the GEO Group had no intention to abolish the state, in this case the IRS (i.e., “market as predator”), in their pursuit of larger profits. Instead, the two corporations used the state to maximize revenue (i.e., “market as parasite”).25

### 1NR---AT Black Exhaustion

#### Racialized capitalism makes Black exhaustion inevitable by criminalizing self-care and gutting funding for social services.

Williams 12

(Emily Williams, MA from DePaul, Thesis entitled, “Resisting internalized oppression: Black women's perceptions of incarceration,” pgs. 34-37)

Secondary to the neoliberal paradigm, Black women have come to be incarcerated as a consequence of an ideological shift around criminality, a divestment in social welfare, and isolation from participation in traditional market economies. In this sense it can be argued that neoliberal processes of criminalization and market creation both exclude Black women from participation in traditional markets and criminalize markets to which they have access and can maximize their human capital. These points and others support the assertion that neoliberal capitalism is a dominating system that has the potential to minimize Black women’s agency like many other historical anti-black systems. An analysis of the effects of the PIC on Black women living in economically disenfranchised situations will demonstrate the degree to which their ability to self determine their social, economic, and interpersonal outcomes can be shaped by American systems and institutions (Alexander, 2010; Roberts, 2008).

As has already been mentioned in this thesis, many anti-incarceration scholars demand an end to present prison practices because of the striking similarities between contemporary incarceration and historical racist institutions like slavery, Jim Crow segregation, and Black Codes (Alexander, 2010, Davis, 2003, 2005; James, 2007; Sudbury, 2005;Wacquant, 2002). These institutions all yielded economic benefits to the state and enforced white supremacy, while at the same time further economically and socially disenfranchising Black communities. Similar social, economic, and interpersonal effects can be found in the lives of Black women who have become intertwined in the PIC. Examples that illuminate the way in which neoliberal policy capitalizes on and further re-inscribes economic disenfranchisement of Black women can be found in employment statistics and the educational rates of women who become incarcerated.

It is significant to note that more than 70 percent of women who become incarcerated report that they had experienced sexual abuse or sexual assault prior to becoming incarcerated (Bush-Baskette, 2012; Human Rights Watch, 1996; Richie, 2012). Moreover, women in prison are three times more likely to have experienced sexual abuse than women who have never been incarcerated (Beck & Harrison, 2007, Freudenburg, 2002). Studies show that approximately 88 percent of women in prison report having been sexually abused (including rape) prior to incarceration (Human Rights Watch, 1996; Freudenburg, 2002). The sexual abuse histories of women in prisons are significant because they create the conditions for drug charges and other criminalized behaviors like prostitution for which women are likely to be imprisoned (Moss, 2005, Davis, 2003). Amid, rapidly rising prison rates for women (800 percent since 1970), the Institute on Women & Criminal Justice (2009) estimates that nearly two-thirds of women in prison are incarcerated for non-violent offenses including drug crimes and prostitution.

This background information becomes relevant when considering how Black women become incarcerated within a neoliberal paradigm in which there is currently a disinvestment of social services; increasingly this divestment has meant that much needed professional health care has gone underfunded. As Richie (2012) notes, “...almost none [of incarcerated Black women] have had long-term mental health care” (conference presentation January 27, 2012). The effects of sexual assaults and childhood sexual abuse can be pervasive and relate to participation in criminalized behavior for which Black women become incarcerated. Many women who experience sexual assault or childhood sexual abuse suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, (PTSD) which is associated with effects like severe depression, anxiety, flashbacks, and low self- esteem (West, 2007). Furthermore, stigma that is often associated with sexual abuse can often cause internalized guilt and shame. West (1999) states:

...shame can eat away at the women’s self-hood...the multi-edged shame that is generated in Black women victim-survivors of intimate violence is a powerful covert weapon of domination. It can train women to locate the deprecating social stigmas and culpability for the violence against them with their own identities.

The way in which Black women can experience sexual assault and childhood sexual abuse is not removed from broader systemic violence. In the case of Black women who may be abused, self-blame for sexual victimization can be engendered by negative stereotypes that portray Black women as hypersexual or as unworthy of protection and respect (West, 1999). Furthermore, the silence that characterizes responses to sexual abuse can be compounded by a general (and substantiated) distrust of police and social services, and even further aggravated by the pressure to not to contribute to further racial degradation of Black communities (West, 1999; Richie, 1996).

#### We don’t have to “neoliberalism is the root cause” to win *persistence of racial neoliberalism is a structural barrier to solving the aff’s harms* – even if its not the root cause, neoliberal governance creates *economic roadblocks* to resolving the aff’s impacts

Wright 9

(Erik Olin Wright, professor of sociology at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, *Envisioning Real Utopias*, pg. 25)

Two other preliminary comments: First, critics of capitalism are sometimes tempted to try to make all of the serious problems and harms of the contemporary world attributable to capitalism. Racism, sexism, war, religious fundamentalism, homophobia – all of these are seen by some critics of capitalism as consequences of capitalism. This temptation should be resisted. Capitalism is not the root of all evils in the world today; there are other causal processes at work which fuel racism, ethno-nationalism, male domination, genocide, war, and other significant forms of oppression. Nevertheless, even in the case of those forms of oppression which capitalism may not itself generate, capitalism may still be implicated by making it more difficult to overcome them. Capitalism may not be the root cause of sexism, for example, but it could make it more difficult to overcome sexism by making it difficult to allocate sufficient resources to good quality, publicly provided childcare services. In the critique of capitalism the critical task, therefore, is to identify those harms which are directly generated by the specific mechanisms of capitalism and to understand the ways in which capitalism may indirectly contribute to impeding the reduction of oppression.